Zamość: the order, the cover story, the administrative fight

Copy! 20 Secret

Teleprinter message No. 197 663 of 31.10.1942 -11.20-

Note of the Reichsführer SS: "agreed"

To the Reichsführer SS at present Field Command Post

Subject: Evacuation of Poles in the District of Lublin (Zamosc) to create space for the settlement of ethnic Germans. Reference: Directive of 4.10.42 in Krakow.

The ordered evacuation of Poles in the District of Lublin (Zamosc), which as to timing depends on the bringing up of the ethnic Germans coming forward for settlement, will presumably be begun in mid-November. For the execution of the undertaking, with which the Umwandererzentralstelle Litzmannstadt -Zamosc Branch- has been charged, the following proposal may, with reference to the directives issued by the Reichsführer on 4.10.42 in Krakow, be submitted in agreement with the offices concerned, with the request for approval:

1) The Polish families of evaluation groups I and II are separated out and taken to Litzmannstadt for Germanization or fine screening. A small part of these families is left behind for the occupation of the so-called "Z-Höfe" arising from the amalgamation of smaller into larger Polish holdings, insofar as resettlers are not at present available.

2) Of the members of evaluation groups III and IV, the children are separated out together with the Poles over 60 years of age and conveyed jointly, that is, in general children with grandparents, into so-called "pension villages". The Poles who are unfit for work, sick and infirm, under 60 years, are likewise transferred to "pension villages". The age limit for the children would be fixed at 14 years (not 10 years), since children

under 14 years of age cannot be placed in work in the Altreich. Under this arrangement the envisaged accommodation of the children in children's education camps still to be procured, and the complete separation from the family bound up with it, can be dispensed with. In the view of all the offices involved, as also of the Higher SS and Police Leader, SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, and of the BdS and the SD Kraków, a transfer of the children into education camps would lead to an extraordinary strengthening of the Polish will to resist in general and to an intensified activity of the Polish resistance movement in particular (in any case only a very small number of the Polish children whose parents are classified in evaluation groups III and IV will be found capable of Germanization).

3) The accommodation in the so-called "pension villages" is planned in such a way that the Poles coming into consideration are additionally housed in already existing villages settled only by Poles. Similar measures have hitherto already been carried out successfully in the Warthegau within the framework of the local displacement of Poles through the creation of "Polish reservations".

The able-bodied members of evaluation group III aged 14 to 60 years are placed in labor deployment in the Reich, without their unfit-for-work dependents. In agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for Labor Deployment they are used as replacements for the Jews still engaged in war-important labor deployment.

5) The members of evaluation group IV aged 14 to 60 years are transported off to the KL Auschwitz.

A deportation of certain portions of the Poles to the Ukraine within the framework of this operation, which in view of the strong band activity would undoubtedly have a dangerous effect and would in part bring with it a numerical strengthening of the bands, could be dispensed with in the case of the proposed registration [and] treatment. I request a directive.

signed Müller, SS-Gruppenführer IV B 4 a - 3666/42g

Measures for the further resettlement

Since the most varied offices take a position against the resettlement on the grounds that too great an unsettling of the ethnic aliens occurs and production is thereby disrupted, the following measures have been taken:

1. The resettlement is propagated by word-of-mouth propaganda as having been stopped.

2. Before the date on which settlement is to take place, nothing is let out by any office. Planning proceeds in secret.

3. The point in time of the settlement is placed after the spring cultivation, so that the ethnic aliens still carry out the planting and the new settlers already come into the enjoyment of the harvest. This has the advantage that, under the aforementioned conditions, the ethnic aliens cultivate their fields in all areas, while the German settlers, however, do not come into danger of being hindered in their spring work, in view of the shortness of time.

4. The resettlement of the Poles is to be carried out in such a way that the good elements are settled, as far as possible voluntarily, in areas cleared by the Security Police, and that the resettlement runs under the title "Establishment of security in the bandit areas". The bad elements are withdrawn bit by bit, insofar as they do not find employment as auxiliary workers.

5. The announcement of the point in time of the settlement takes place only on the day of the resettlement.

6. All villages are in advance occupied with Landwacht in all organizational units formed from settlers, which, trained beforehand, are to spare one's own SS forces.

7. Is it intended to give the settlers a confirmation of how much they have left behind in house, farmstead, livestock and inventory, without entering into a binding performance obligation for this. Whether this performance is then one day to take place in Brazil or in one in the far East is left to the future. The resettled persons are only to be given the feeling that at some later time a compensation for their left-behind property will take place.

SS-Gruppenführer and Lieutenant General of Police

Copy of a copy.

Lublin, 24 February 1943

The Governor of the District of Lublin in the General Government

Journal No. 33/43.

To the Governor General Reich Minister Dr. Frank Krakow Castle.

via the State Secretary in the Government Dr. Bühler Krakow Government of the General Government.

Subject: Effects of the resettlement in the County of Zamosc.

I. Course of the resettlement.

The settlement of the County of Zamosc, planned for some time already by the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood (RKF), began on 26 November 1942. So far about 9,000 Germans from Bessarabia and the rest of the Southeast have been placed as settlers on the land in the northern half of the County of Zamosc. The resettlement has so far covered about 40,000 ha of land in villages which the offices of the RKF specially picked out.

The Poles affected by the resettlement were, insofar as they could be seized, for the overwhelmingly greater part consigned to an SS labor camp in Auschwitz (hydrogenation plant), while a relatively small number were placed at the disposal of the labor administration for other deployment in the Reich. The Poles from the resettlement areas not sent to the Reich were placed as farmers or laborers for the settlers in so-called Z-villages, which lie between the German settlements. Those unfit for work were accommodated in other Districts in so-called pension villages. The Ukrainians of the settlement area resident above all in the north-eastern and eastern part of the County of Zamosc were at first provisionally resettled into the immediately adjoining western part of the County of Hrubieschow.

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At present their in-settlement into about 35 - 40 ethnically mixed villages is under way, which through the out-settlement of Poles are now becoming unambiguously Ukrainian. The out-settled Poles are, insofar as they are fit for work, dispatched into the Reich.

The out-settled Poles were given only little time to get ready and were allowed to take with them only hastily snatched-up hand luggage. In consequence they lose, apart from insignificant remnants, their entire property. The resettlement of the Ukrainians, by contrast, proceeded in such a way that these received a few hours' time and could then withdraw on their own carts, taking with them a part of their household goods and inventory.

The in-settlement and out-settlement measures were carried out essentially by the offices of the RKF themselves. In the in-settlement of the Germans and the settlement of Poles in the Z villages the local Land Office took part. For the supervision of the resettlement measures the SS and Police Leader has employed 500 police officials and about 80 Sonderdienst men, who were withdrawn from their other important tasks in the District. The cooperation between the administration and the offices of the RKF was made extraordinarily difficult by the fact that the offices of the RKF failed to give the administration thorough and sufficient information and surrounded their measures with the cloak of secrecy even towards authoritative men of the administration. Thus it is, for example, not possible to obtain unambiguous figures on the Poles out-settled by the SS. As a result of the great flight movement caused by the resettlement it is said to be a matter of only about 25,000 persons any more.

II. Fears of the non-German population.

The fears of the non-German population consist in particular in the following:

1. Insecurity of life:

Fear of treatment like Jews or concentration camps.

2. Insecurity of the family:

Tearing apart of families, of mothers from children.

3. Insecurity of economic existence.

Contrary to the order of the State Secretary Dr. Bühler of 7.X.42 the Poles are not brought to a new economic basis of existence, but rather

zu

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to a substantial extent dispatched to Auschwitz for forced labour. They lose their property almost entirely!

III. Effects of the resettlement in the directly affected counties (Kreise) of Zamosc and Hrubieschow.

1. Flight of the rural population:

For the reasons set out under II, an extensive movement of flight took hold of the rural population shortly after the onset of the resettlement, in order to escape the supposed threat to their lives and their family and moreover to save at least a noteworthy part of their property. The peasants flee by night and fog with the help of their horse-drawn wagons and taking with them the family, a part of the inventory and above all the livestock. For this they use side roads and attempt, in most cases successfully, to reach the nearest bandit hordes or the neighbouring counties, where they betake themselves to acquaintances or relatives in the countryside. Since the movement of flight was by its nature unplanned, there are today already in the counties of Zamosc and Hrubieschow a number of almost empty villages, out of which even the last will yet be stolen. Apart from the damage in the agricultural sphere still to be discussed, the movement of flight substantially impeded the settlement in so far as it affected villages which were designated for the settling-in of the Germans. Moreover, the fact that only about 25,000 Poles were seized by the police for expulsion speaks very plainly, since about twice that number had to be reckoned with. Ten thousand, then, have fled. In the entire vicinity of the resettlement area a further tens of thousands of peasants stand ready with packed baggage to take flight should the resettlement be continued. The livestock holdings, however, are already now considerably decimated by slaughtering and black-market sale!

2. Insecurity:

It goes without saying that a substantial part of the fugitives, who have nothing more to lose, have contributed to a strengthening of the bandit gangs in the south of the District

has contributed. It is striking that since December 1942 bands of several hundred persons, among whom women and children are occasionally to be found, have again quite substantially increased the insecurity. One can already speak of a popular movement organized in a military-like manner, which has drawn closed detachments of the police into engagements with heavy losses, indeed even struck back. This applies in particular to the south of Kreis Zamosc and the southwest of Kreis Bilgoraj, where a larger operation by the Wehrmacht and police recently took place, in which about 250 bandits were shot and, above all, a larger number of weapons was captured by the Wehrmacht, without, however, its being possible, for lack of sufficient forces, to speak of an annihilation of the bands that have appeared in these regions.

According to the reports available to me, since the beginning of December 1942, 37 German new settlers have so far met a violent death at the hands of bandits in their settlements. A further 16 were injured. Particularly tragic is the fact that among the dead there is also a number of women and children. This high casualty figure is above all to be attributed to the attack on the village of Cieszyn (Skierbieszow commune), 18 km northeast of Zamosc. This German settler village was attacked in the night of 25 to 26.1.43 by about 120 bandits. The bandits came up on sleighs, surrounded and set fire to one farmstead after another. In these fires and the firefights, 30 German men, women and children alone lost their lives, while 8 were wounded. The bandits carrying out the attack were accompanied by women and children, who plundered the houses during the firefight and the fires. There is no doubt that a pronounced act of revenge by expelled peasants is present here. The arson attacks in the villages of Kreis Zamosc newly settled with Germans have likewise increased abruptly as a consequence of the resettlement. Thus, in the period from 9 to 28.XII.42, 125 buildings in the Zamosc settlement area alone were burned down as a result of bandit raids, in the course of which the latter fired with tracer ammunition.

All these occurrences are by no means surprising. It goes without saying that a peasant population which believes its life and its family to be threatened, and which knows that it is losing its possessions and property, resorts to such acts of desperation. The resettlement

The resettlement has in any case made bandits, political conspirators and an extremely dangerous element of insecurity out of the Polish peasants endangered by it, who hitherto, as a result of their correct treatment, constituted a positive and constructive element! The assertion repeatedly put forward by the offices of the RKF that the insecurity of the country will substantially improve in the course of the resettlement is false. Since it is impossible to fill agricultural labourer, forestry labourer and other simple occupations with Germans, the RKF has set as the provisional goal of the settlement the establishment of a ratio of 1:1 between Germans and non-Germans. Nothing will change in this in the future either, so that one must always reckon with an ethnically alien population amounting to 50% in the settlement area here. Given this state of affairs, all restless elements in the settlement area still find sufficient possibilities of support among 50% of the population. But even if the settlement area could be Germanized 100%, that changes nothing about the fact that the long-range effects of the resettlement will only enormously increase the insecurity in other areas not yet settled by Germans. According to the experience so far there is no doubt that the resettlement has led to the most dangerous burden on security since 1939.

3. Agriculture:

The feeling of losing his patch of soil in a more or less short time has aroused in the Polish peasant, who hitherto has complied very well with the duties imposed on him by the German administration, a deep ill-humour and despair, which naturally cannot remain without repercussions on his performance. Thus the delivery of milk, butter and other agricultural products has already fallen off considerably, particularly in the districts of Zamosc and Hrubieschow. Especially clear is the drop in milk delivery in the district of Hrubieschow, where in November 1942 2.5 million were delivered against only 600,000 l in January of this year. This alarm signal of a drop of 75% leaves nothing to be desired in clarity. The pig stock in a large number of communities of this district has decreased by 60%, the poultry stock by 90%, since the peasant disposes of and slaughters everything in order not to lose it without compensation! In the resettlement areas

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resettlement areas of both Kreise there is in fact a lack, insofar as anything at all is still present in the villages, of the most necessary means for the continuation of the cultivation of the land. If it is pointed out by the office of the RKF that the German farmers who have been settled in are capable and that the milk delivery at the dairy in Zamosc has risen from 90,000 to 360,000 l per month, then from the comparison of these figures with those cited above for the Kreis Hrubieschow it becomes apparent what the real relation is, namely that the Germans settled in constitute a vanishing minority as against the entire Polish population of the District or indeed of the General Government. (Besides, the own consumption of butter among the German settlers is substantially greater than among the Poles).

Particularly dangerous is the effect of the resettlement upon the production battle and the spring sowing. The mere fact that there are empty villages stands in crying contrast to the requirements of the war, without the administration being able to remedy this evil completely, since the lack of the requisite equipment and above all the complete absence of seed grain prevents a rapid and thorough setting in motion of the farms left lying idle. According to the reports of the Kreishauptleute in Zamosc and Hrubieschow, only little seed grain is still to be found in the resettlement area, as a result of its being carried off by the refugees. Likewise, 1,000 horses are lacking in the Kreis Zamosc for the barest spring sowing. Given the complete insecurity of the Polish farmer it is self-evident that he will expend neither money nor much labor on his holding, which can be taken from him at any time, although in the past years of German rule he has undoubtedly done so. A production battle, however, cannot be fought without substantial investments being made. Since the offices of the RKF, contrary to the repeated urgent requests of the administration, are extending the resettlement to large holdings as well, although these are of quite particular importance for securing the food supply, it is self-evident that the difficulties already discussed now make themselves felt here too.

4. Other consequences:

Since the inhabitants of the city of Zamosc rightly assume that this city too is designated for the resettlement, here too a flight movement has [arisen].

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flight movement made itself noticeable, in that the townspeople "go away on a trip" with a great deal of luggage. They then come back now and again in order to fetch further items of their household goods. The consequence of this is that commercial life in the city of Zamosc has noticeably slackened, that a whole series of shops and businesses lie idle, which has made itself felt very disruptively precisely in this city as the center of the resettlement.

But the resettlement also brings with it very palpable aggravations of the administrative work. It is incomprehensible how the offices of the RKF resettle out forest workers trained by the German administration, despite representations to the contrary, and thereby paralyze the war-important activity of the forestry administration. The fact that a part of the rural population has fled with their horses, or else has disposed of them somewhere, impairs in the most sensitive way the provision of draft teams for war-important purposes. In this manner a severe crisis of the war-important timber haulage has set in in the districts of Hrubieschow and Zamosc.

From what has been said so far it follows that the administration has experienced quite enormous aggravations in its normal fields of duty as a result of the resettlement. Added to this are the very extensive other additional tasks that are connected with the resettlement, in particular the building up of the new communities, without sufficient German personnel being available for the community administrations, so that work unfortunately still has to be carried out with Poles, If one further considers that through the new call-ups the personnel of the Kreishauptmannschaften (district captaincies) has shrunk to a minimum, then it is not surprising if the performance of the affected administrations can no longer suffice under such circumstances.

IV. Long-range effects of the resettlement.

1. Political matters:

Whereas up to the beginning of the resettlement in the district of Zamosc the non-German population of the General Government, in particular the peasant population, could reckon with a certain security of their property and their family on the basis of repeated assurances of the Herr Governor General and of the administrative authorities, and could work accordingly, this is now no longer the case. The

The political and economic slogans of the resistance movement and of the Bolsheviks, which hitherto merely asserted the insecurity of the Poles' property, now have a clear evidentiary basis. Not least, the refugees from the resettlement areas are spreading these facts.

Zamosc has thereby become a beacon whose effect reaches far beyond the boundaries of the resettlement area and of the District. Bolshevism has thereby lost an essential part of its terrors for the Polish population.

The effects of the resettlement described under III are evident in all parts of the District, with the exception of one county poor in soil.

Security:

Since the beginning of the resettlement, a considerable activation of band activity is to be observed above all in the south of the District, but also in other parts, in particular in the counties of Bilgoraj, Krasnik, Pulawy and Zamosc.

A new element of insecurity for the Polish peasants lies recently in the fact that German settlers from the county of Zamosc have moved into the county of Krasnystaw in order there to exchange by force their poor horses and wagons, which they found in the village assigned to them, for better ones in the county of Krasnystaw. Characteristic of this is that it happened with the express remark that the Poles did not need the objects anyway, because they too would be resettled out next year.

3. Agriculture:

Even in the counties most distant from the resettlement area, the view prevails among the rural population that it is not worth continuing their farms, since by way of the resettlement they would sooner or later lose everything anyway. As a result, agricultural production and delivery are continually declining. The peasants are slaughtering and selling their livestock and making themselves ready for flight. In the south of the county of Cholm over 100 farmsteads already stand empty, although in this county no resettlement whatever has yet taken place. The remote effects of the resettlement multiply quite considerably, precisely in the agricultural sphere, the effects of the resettlement in the directly affected areas.

Insurance,

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Assurances that the resettlement would be confined solely to the area recorded hitherto find no credence. The Polish agronomists have given the Kreislandwirt (county agricultural officer) in Pulawy unambiguously to understand this.

Particularly characteristic is the following incident: In the northern part of the Kreis Pulawy the competent Bezirkslandwirt (district agricultural officer) ordered an ascertainment of the cattle stocks for the better collection of milk. The consequence of this was that the peasants from six villages, out of fear of the beginning resettlement, drove all of their livestock into the Kreis Radzyn in order to lodge it there with peasants known to them. This happened in an area which lies about 150 km away from the resettlement area.

In this state of affairs the head of my Department of Food and Agriculture, Landwirtschaftsrat Dr. Claus, saw himself compelled, with my consent, to declare to the president of his Main Department, Naumann, that he could not assume responsibility for an orderly execution of the Erzeugungsschlacht (production battle) in the Lublin District, which in this respect is of decisive importance for the General Government, for as long as the Polish peasant had not been given back the feeling of security on his own soil.

What this means for the food supply of the Reich, given a total delivery by the District last year of 370,000 t of grain alone, requires no further explanation.

4. Other Effects:

Although the Ukrainians affected by the resettlement in the Kreis Zamosc were for political reasons treated preferentially in comparison with the Poles, the feeling of insecurity has seized the Ukrainian ethnic group in the District as well, which entailed corresponding consequences, particularly in the agricultural sphere.

Characteristic of this is that the Orthodox Archbishop of Cholm and Podlachia wanted, some time ago, to have a declaration from me to the effect that the Ukrainians would in general not be affected by the resettlement measures.

I was of course unable to give this declaration.

This development is extremely regrettable in the interest of the Ukrainian policy pursued by the General Government, since now

the

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the danger exists that the Ukrainians and Poles, hitherto always hostile towards one another, will come together in the feeling of being jointly threatened, which in the interest of our rule in this area in wartime should be prevented under all circumstances.

On the other hand, a part of the Poles, on account of the preferential treatment of the Ukrainians in the resettlement in Zamosc, has in the counties of Cholm and Hrubieschow gone over to joining the Orthodox Ukrainian Church en masse, in order in this way to obscure its Polish descent and to be treated better as Ukrainians in the resettlement. The two Kreishauptleute thereupon immediately ordered a provisional stop to the conversion movement to the Orthodox Church, which in turn gave occasion for complications with the Orthodox Archbishop in Cholm, who is positively disposed towards German rule; the final settlement of these is still pending.

V. Result:

In summary it must be established that the resettlement in the county of Zamosc has had the following drastic consequences for the whole District of Lublin:

1. The spring cultivation in agriculture, and thereby the coming harvest and the quota collections, are endangered in the highest degree, since the hitherto willing and undemanding Polish and Ukrainian peasants, put into the utmost unrest by the absolute uncertainty regarding their own future and that of their family, have no further interest in the cultivation and are partly disposing of, partly slaughtering their livestock, etc.

2. The insecurity in the District is again increasing considerably, since on the one hand, through the expulsion, large numbers of hitherto peaceful peasants are in their desperation driven into the camp of the bandits, while on the other hand around 600 men of police forces are constantly needed for the resettlement and are thereby withdrawn from the combating of bandits. This insecurity is naturally especially strong in the county of Zamosc and in the neighbouring counties, where bands of a strength of 100 men and more have again appeared and have become very active through raids and lootings. In addition, the German new settlers have suffered quite particularly under the raids of the peasants driven from house and farm who have become bandits. So far over 30 dead, among them women and children, are to be re-

-corded

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to record, besides a further number of fatalities among the police and Wehrmacht. As a further disadvantage it is also to be noted that these racially valuable German farmers come into substantially worse living conditions, whereby, given the momentary situation on the building market, only slight assistance can be granted to them.

A continuation of the resettlement would result in further considerable casualties among the new settlers and also among the police, since the farmers driven from house and farm and separated from their families are, in their desperation, capable of anything.

The two most important tasks of the Lublin District in wartime lie in guaranteeing security as a supply area for the Eastern Army and in the highest possible harvest production and collection in the interest of the food situation of the Reich.

At the present stage of total war it cannot be answered for if the fulfilment of these two important tasks is so drastically endangered. - However desirable the settlement of the District with Germans may be, just as little can it be answered for at this moment in view of the catastrophic consequences. - The Reich needs every ton of foodstuffs to secure the food supply. The Lublin District has delivered almost 700,000 t of grain and potatoes alone from this year's harvest. If the resettlement is continued, in the view of my agricultural staff, an under-production and under-collection of 100,000 t must be reckoned with in grain alone!

Under these circumstances I request most urgently and with all emphasis that the resettlement, hitherto temporarily halted, be immediately and definitively discontinued and that this be announced.

Even if this happens, we shall, especially with the considerably reduced number of German staff, have the greatest difficulty in removing the mistrust of the population, in reoccupying the empty farms and villages and in achieving a tolerably adequate execution of the spring sowing.

In the event of a continuation of the resettlement I can assume no guarantee whatsoever for the coming harvest and its collection.

signed Zörner Governor.

Personal Staff Reichsführer-SS Records Administration [illegible] Geh. [secret] / S e c r e t !

Statement of Position

on the report of Governor Zörner to the Governor General Frank concerning the effect of the resettlement in the county of Zamosc.

In the following, the objections to the settlement from the report of Governor Zörner are summarized briefly, according to the sequence and numbering as they correspond to the report. I have added my statement of position after each point.

I. Course of the resettlement.

a) 40,000 ha of land were registered, which the office of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of Germandom had specially selected.

on a) In fact 52,000 ha of land were registered and selected in cooperation with the Land Office at the Governor of the District of Lublin.

b) The Poles were for the predominant part delivered to the SS camp Auschwitz (hydrogenation plant); a smaller number came to labor deployment.

on b) Hardly 40 persons (criminals) have so far been transferred to Auschwitz; approx. 6,000 have so far been placed in the Reich or here.

c) The Ukrainians had a few hours' time and were able to take along part of their belongings.

on c) The removal of the Ukrainians was prepared by the SD for weeks. They therefore had sufficient time to pack up their goods and chattels, migrated by way of their own relief committee into their new villages and there received more land and soil than they previously possessed.

d) For surveillance, 500 police officials and 80 Sonderdienst men are detailed, who are withdrawn from other important tasks in the District.

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re d) In fact only 300 police officials have been detailed, namely 80 from the Lublin Command, 70 from the Zamosc Battalion, 150 have been taken from the foreign-ethnic guard units. From the Sonderdienst 40 men have been detailed, while 40 have been working in the settlement area for over 2 years. No forces were drawn in from the rest of the district.

e) Cooperation between administrative offices and offices of the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood is proving difficult, since the administration was not thoroughly and sufficiently informed and [they] surrounded their measures with the cloak of a secret.

re e) Governor Zörner was informed by me orally; the head of the Internal Administration took part in important meetings. Matters which concerned the administration were always communicated in writing. Through the Settlers' Economic Association, which is responsible for the settlers' economic concerns, all competent offices were brought in directly through their department heads.

II. Insecurity among the non-German population.

1. Insecurity of life. Fear of treatment like Jews or of compulsory confinement in a concentration camp (Kz.).

2. Insecurity of the family

3. Insecurity of economic existence. Poles are sent to Auschwitz for forced labor.

These points are rumors which were kindled among the Polish population by the resistance movement. The facts have for the most part proved the opposite. To adopt the opponent's slogan as one's own is incorrect; the administration would here have had the duty to come out positively and energetically against these untrue rumors.

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III. Effects of the resettlement in the directly affected districts of Zamosc and Hrubieszow.

1.) Flight of the rural population.

a) Flight movement of the rural population on the basis of the reasons named under II.

on a) Since the rumours have already been refuted by facts, a calming has also soon come about, and not only is a flight movement no longer to be recorded, but in the non-settlement area the entire population has returned, and even today numerous persons who had fled are still returning to the settlement area.

b) Joining the bandits.

on b) It was unambiguously established by the Security Police that no one from among the population that had fled joined the bandits, but rather that this assertion is likewise to be traced back to rumours.

c) A number of empty villages, out of which even the last remaining things are still being stolen.

on c) Empty villages no longer exist. Nor could any information about this be given upon inquiry at administrative offices.

d) In the vicinity of the resettlement area tens of thousands stand ready with packed luggage in order to take flight.

on d) This is a rumour. The beginning of the spring work shows rather that the farmers are present in full number on their farms and are not thinking of flight at all.

e) Illicit slaughtering and illicit selling.

on e) Illicit slaughterings and illicit sales have, thanks to the failed economic policy of the administration, always existed in this area. Findings obtained from the Kreishauptmann have shown that these move within a "normal range".

2.) Insecurity.

a) Bands of more than 100 persons appear, among whom women and children are found.

b) Militarily organized popular movement.

c) Police are drawn into engagements involving heavy losses, indeed are even beaten back.

d) The police operation has brought about no destruction of the bands.

re " The resistance and band movement has always been strong in the districts of Zamosc and Bilgoraj. It is under continuous observation by the police. An increase due to the settlement could by no means be established. A large-scale security operation has indeed rolled up the entire organization and is at this very moment being completely concluded with the remaining part of the Bilgoraj Forest. The proof of the success of this operation is the complete pacification in and around the settlement area. It is a vile assertion that the police were beaten back anywhere. In these points the lack of objectivity of the reporting shows itself particularly, especially since I, as the person responsible for security, was not questioned about this, but rather merely peddled reports have been recorded.

e) 37 German settlers have met their death through bandit raids, 16 were injured.

f) Especially the village of Czieszyn, which was attacked by 120 bandits. In this, 30 German men, women and children lost their lives; 8 were wounded. The bandits were accompanied by women and children who plundered the houses during the firefight. Expelled peasants have stated this.

g) The arson attacks too have increased sharply; 125 buildings burned down from 9 to 28.12 through the firing of tracer ammunition.

re " It is correct that there have been dead through raids by a bandit group. This bandit group has meanwhile been destroyed together with its following. That women and children accompanied bandits is untrue; likewise that 125 buildings burned down. Rather, it is correct that there were 28 buildings.

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In comparison with other years, a larger number of fires has occurred annually in this area.

h) The resettlement has in any case made, out of the peasants promoted by it, who hitherto, as a result of their correct treatment, constituted a positive and constructive element, bandits, political conspirators and an extremely dangerous element of insecurity.

on h) The settlement area was already a bandit area in Polish times. A state of emergency had to be imposed here repeatedly. This area has also given us constant trouble. Especially during the bringing in of the harvest. Thus even the correct treatment by the administration could no longer change these elements. Here the administration overlooks that it was owing solely to the police that it was able to exist in this area at all. The administration therefore assesses the situation wrongly.

i) False assertion by the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood that the insecurity of the country will improve in the course of the resettlement.

on i) The effect of the settlement now shows that a pacification is setting in, since all insecure elements are being forced out. That such a definitive pacification can only be established after some time lies in the nature of the matter itself.

k) Agricultural and forestry workers, as well as other simple occupations, cannot be filled with Germans; the Reich Commissioner for the Strengthening of German Nationhood must therefore settle in a ratio of 1 : 1 between Germans and non-Germans. This is also to remain so. Through the 50 % ethnically alien population that remains in existence, insecure elements continue to be supported.

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Re k) The Reich Commissar settles at a ratio of 1:1, so that

1.) the inferior soils designated for afforestation are not first settled with Germans, only to remove them again in the course of the afforestation, but rather the ethnic aliens remain sitting on these soils, in order to leave forestry too its workers.

2.) those Poles too who live in Z-villages are available as auxiliary labour for German concerns, since at present there is still a lack of farm servants.

3.) a land reserve for returning war participants is formed on good soils, in order at some time to have Reich Germans interspersed among the ethnic Germans as well. It has been shown that the remaining Poles have, through correct treatment, become absolutely willing elements, since they do after all come from the efficient part of the Poles. It has been shown that in the attack on Cziezyn these Poles fought on the side of the settlers against the bandits. There is no case in which these Poles have had an effect favouring the bandits.

l) The resettlement is the most dangerous burden since 1939.

Re l) The worries before the Russian campaign and others besides were probably up to today the greater burden. But since these were absorbed entirely by the SS and police, this fact is not known to the Governor. This point is therefore to be designated as a figure of speech.

3.) Agriculture.

a) The resettlement has produced despair among the Polish peasants, who have hitherto fulfilled their duty very well, a despair which cannot remain without repercussion on their performance.

b) Agricultural products have already declined. Hrubieszow [?] from 2,500,000 to 600,000 l. of milk, pig stock in a number of communities reduced by 60%, poultry by 90%. The peasant slaughters everything in order not to lose it without compensation.

- 7 -

re a) b) A statistic shows that in December 1942 6,046.669 litres of milk were delivered, while in January 5,715.980 litres of milk were delivered. That is a decrease of approx. 330,000 litres, or approx. 5 %, which is seasonally caused by the lack of green fodder. For this reason it declines still further in the month of February. It has further been established that the delivery of horses at the markets has never been as great as it is now, and that the delivery of livestock, eggs and grain quotas is proceeding normally. In the month of January a further approx. 30,000 tons of grain were delivered. This is a communication of the Department of Food and Agriculture, whereby the accusations are refuted.

c) The increase in the milk removal by the Germans from 90,000 to 360,000 litres cannot make good the shortfall in Kreis Hrubieszow. Moreover the Germans' own consumption is greater than that of the Poles.

re c) The increase in the milk removal is the best proof of the greater productive capacity of the settler. Zamosc is approx. 1/3 the size of Kreis Hrubieszow and can therefore also not be drawn upon for comparison to cover a shortfall there. The Germans' own consumption is already smaller than that of the Poles because of the reduced number. But through the compulsory delivery further proof is given of the correctness of the settlement, since the Poles did after all let the greatest part disappear into the black market.

d) The empty villages stand in screaming contradiction to the requirements of the war. The administration cannot procure the necessary equipment and seed for setting the abandoned holdings in operation.

re d) There are no more empty villages, and if the administration cannot bring up the necessary equipment and seed, it thereby at most proves its own incapacity. The settlement area is in any case today fully equipped by the Reich Commissioner with the requisites for the spring cultivation.

-8-

- 8 -

e) Owing to carrying off there is only little seed grain in the settlement area.

on e) If seed grain is lacking, this is caused by the fact that the German authorities had until then not succeeded in making a fair recording of quotas possible; otherwise 10,000 ha more land could not suddenly appear through the Reich Commissar's survey than had hitherto been known to the German authority. On the other hand, however, the Poles had to hand over their seed grain, since it had been laid down that the district cooperative was to distribute new [seed grain] to the farmers for the spring sowing. The seed grain is therefore not lacking as a result of carrying off.

f) Likewise 1,000 horses are lacking in the settlement area.

on f) At present only 400 horses are still lacking, which however have already been made ready for transport away into the settlement area, and merely as a result of transport difficulties the question could not yet be solved.

g) The Reich Commissar is extending the settlement to large enterprises as well, contrary to the urgent requests of the administration.

on g) It is a fact that the Department of Food and Agriculture belonging to the administration has for months been pressing to take over 100 large enterprises in the settlement area as well, and that merely for lack of suitable personnel from the SS or from the settlers these could not yet be filled.

5.) Other consequences.

a) In the town of Zamosc a movement of flight has likewise become noticeable. Household goods are being taken along. The commercial life of the town has perceptibly declined.

on a) The overmanned commercial life is in the course of being cleared up, and already 1,000 heads of the settlers have been set to work, who are meeting their obligations.

b) The resettlement brings with it perceptible impediments in administrative work.

- 9 -

on b) Impediments in the administration cannot be an obstacle to further settlement.

c) The forest workers trained by the German administration are, despite representations to the contrary, being resettled out, whereby the forest administration is paralysed. The provision of draught teams is severely threatened by the flight of horses.

on c) Forest-worker areas are afforestation areas and are not settled by Germans at all. The forest administration reports that in the previous year at the same time only 18 % of the timber had been delivered, whereas this year 76 % have already been hauled away. This is similar in the rest of the district as well; no impairment has occurred either in the timber haulage or in the resin extraction. The accusations rest for the most part on rumours. In the difficult forest region of Bilgoraj attention is to be drawn to the exemplary work of the police.

d) The administration must take upon itself impediments on account of the settlement, such as e.g. the building-up of the new communities. Through conscription the German personnel has fallen to a minimum, and in the settlement area work must be done with Poles.

on d) This only proves that the administration is not capable of fulfilling its tasks, and the administrative business in the settlement area is at present carried out with the help of the Reich Commissar together with the settlers.

IV. Long-range effect of the resettlement.

1.) Political matters.

a) Through repeated assurance by the Governor General the Pole was able to reckon with a certain security of his property. Through the resettlement the resistance movement and the Bolshevists have obtained their basis of proof.

on a) The Governor General ought not, out of ethno-political considerations, in the interest of the German people, to have given such assurances as go far beyond the bounds of a correct treatment of alien ethnics. That hostile illegal organizations from this

-10-

- 10 -

to make capital is no astonishing matter, for they would have done it anyway, whether or not there was an occasion for it. An enemy slogan cannot be a ground for hindrance.

b) Zamosc has become a beacon. Bolshevism has lost its deterrent effect. The effects are showing themselves in the whole District.

on b) To take a position on this is superfluous; it only shows the tendency that even the vilest enemy slogans are used in order to produce "evidentiary bases".

2.) Security.

a) Band activity has received an activation.

b) Insecurity is increased in that German settlers forcibly exchange their poor horses with Poles in neighbouring districts.

on " Is the repetition of a phrase, whereby it is striking that the factual opinion of the competent office was not obtained on this.

3.) Agriculture.

a) In the most remote districts the rural population holds the view that they should not carry on their farms, since they will be resettled anyway.

on a) The spring sowing taken in hand everywhere proves the opposite.

b) In the district of Cholm 100 farmsteads stand empty.

on b) Despite inquiry these farmsteads could not be ascertained.

c) The Poles do not believe that the resettlement remains restricted to Zamosc.

on c) This is a rumour, just as the Poles also do not believe that we will win the war.

d) The head of the Department of Food and Agriculture, SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Claus, sees himself compelled to decline responsibility for the production battle.

- 11 -

The Governor states in his report: "In this situation the head of the Department for Food and Agriculture, Agricultural Councillor Dr. Claus, saw himself compelled, with my consent, to declare to the president of his Main Department, Naumann, that he could not assume responsibility for an orderly execution of the production battle in the Lublin District — which in this respect is of decisive importance for the General Government — as long as the Polish peasant had not been given back the feeling of security on his soil. What this means for the food supply of the Reich, given a total delivery by the District alone of 370,000 tons of grain in the previous year, requires no further explanation."

on d) At a discussion, in the presence of SS-Obergruppenführer Krüger, SS-Sturmbannführer Dr. Claus did not express himself in any such manner. He also denies having made such a statement.

4.) Other effect.

a) Ukrainians are likewise not satisfied despite accommodating treatment.

on a) The resettlement of the Ukrainians was carried out on a voluntary basis; that they are not satisfied with it is due to their political attitude, since despite the accommodating stance of the administration they have so far been satisfied with nothing, although their performance lags behind that of the Poles.

b) The Archbishop of Cholm demands a declaration that the Ukrainians will not be affected by the resettlement measures. The declaration could not be given by the Governor. This means damage to Ukrainian policy, and there is the danger that the Poles and Ukrainians, who face each other as enemies, will unite.

on b) It is characteristic here that the Governor, in such a case, where it is a pure matter of authority, does not express himself positively towards the Archbishop. His tendency regarding the settlement appears particularly confirmed by this point.

c) Poles are joining the Orthodox Church in order to blur their Polish descent. A prohibition on this has been issued by the administration, which has led to complications with the Archbishop in Cholm.

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- 12 -

on c) Given the Governor's attitude toward the Archbishop, this is not surprising.

V. Result.

1.) Spring cultivation endangered in the extreme, since the Polish and Ukrainian peasants are too disquieted.

2.) a) Insecurity in the District is increasing considerably, since peaceable peasants have been driven into the camp of the bandits.

b) 600 men of police forces are permanently subjected to the combating of bandits.

c) Bandit groups have been reinforced. So far 30 dead are to be recorded among the ethnic Germans.

d) The racially valuable ethnic German peasants are coming onto poor farms.

e) The German settlers and German police will have great losses.

f) Securing of supplies and increased harvest production and collection is endangered.

g) The delivery of 700,000 tons of grain and potatoes will decline this year by 100,000 tons.

These assertions are only the summary of the foregoing, which appear refuted by my comments. A pronounced tendency, since the statements are corroborated by nothing or by little, is discernible against the settlement.

In conclusion I may state:

1.) All the accusations repeat themselves and are proven by nothing.

2.) The sources of these accusations are not known here. An inquiry among the competent offices, e.g. among the Kreishauptleute [district chiefs], among the Security Police, etc., has shown that they do not originate from there either.

3.) I would have been grateful if I had been informed of such matters in good time, even when it was only a matter of a rumour, in order to be able to remedy possible improprieties.

4.) The Governor has issued to the administration a prohibition on cooperation, so that collaboration was and is being obstructed by him.

It can therefore be established that a purely unobjective attitude toward the settlement exists.

Teleprinter message 69 [stamp, green: Personal Staff Reichsführer-SS / [illegible] Geh./ 266 (handwritten)] Secret

To the Higher SS and Police Leader East SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Police Krüger

Krakow I have received your two teleprinter messages of 28.2.1943, Nos. 1167 and 1168. My orders stand. Keep me informed of the further course of the matter, in particular

whether the Governor General requests this report from you. signed: H. Himmler. 28.2.1943

Bra/Dr.

+ s s d/ hsspf ost krk no. 1168 28.2.43 1650 = the Higher SS and Police Leader East .-

file ref.: p.k./43 .-

to the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police, Heinrich H i m m l e r , -- H o c h w a l d -- ==

= == = s e c r e t = == =

Reichsführer.

Gruppenführer Globocnik brought the following teleprinter message [fs.] to my knowledge:

'' Governor Zoerner is taking every conceivable step against the resettlement, in that he

1) forbids employees any collaboration in the settlement.

2) prohibits the compliance with instructions issued to authorities on the basis of the Reich Commissioner's authority to issue instructions.

3) declared at a secret meeting of department heads: he forbids any further settlement within the city of Lublin, since it is not to be a settlement area, and makes the further deployment dependent on his approval.-

4) a Polish barber was resettled out in favour of a resettler, in agreement with the Stadthauptmann; since this Pole is his personal barber, the governor demands the immediate return-settlement of the same, with a deadline set for 15.3.1943 .-

5) the office chief reports that every further resettlement intention has been blocked, and that the Governor General is prepared to let it come to a showdown at all costs vis-à-vis the Reichsführer-SS. Governor Zoerner also proceeds in this sense.'' -

I have informed Gruppenführer Globocnik that instructions from the administrative side are to be refused.- Orders in the sector of settlement are issued by me alone. Concerning item 4), I gave the instruction that the governor's wish is -- not -- to be granted.==

Heil Hitler. signed: K r u e g e r SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Pol-

ice .++

+-transmitted by rvst bln+

+ s s d/ hsspf ost krk no. 1167 28.2.43 1650 = the Higher SS and Police Leader East .-

ref.: kr/ fi - pk/ 43 .-

to the Reichsführer-SS and Chief of the German Police Heinrich H i m m l e r ,

==== s e c r e t ==

The latter made available to me the following letter from the gg. to Gruppenführer Globocnik:

'' I request of you at once a detailed report on the resettlement measures hitherto carried out by you in the district of Lublin, since as responsible Reich representative for the gg. I have so far not received such a report from you. I should like to emphasize expressly that your procedure in the district of Lublin in this question is being subjected to the severest criticism, and that the events hitherto are not able to give my consent to further settlement attempts at this infinitely difficult point in time. I am also informed that the harvest in the district of Lublin is seriously endangered, as above all the security situation in the district of Lublin has, through this measure, undergone a monstrous, most casualty-laden deterioration for the Germans. I await your report within 8 days. Heil Hitler. Frank ''

I have instructed Gruppenführer Globocnik to inform Frank that he direct personal wishes to me, as Higher SS and Police Leader .==

Heil Hitler, signed: K r u e g e r , SS-Obergruppenführer and General of the Police .++

+-transmitted via rvst bln+

+1745 eins no. 1167 28.2.43 erh/ vhwd schue+

28 February 1943

I have issued a propaganda directive on the treatment of the Eastern question, which has aroused very great attention. Governor General Frank writes in a letter how warmly he welcomes it. That is at least the beginning of a new course toward the East.

General Hellmich again pays me a visit; he has the commission from the Führer to raise troop formations from Eastern soldiers. He urgently asks me to keep pressing the Führer for an Eastern proclamation. The soldiers from the Eastern peoples prove themselves excellently; but they are still always susceptible to Soviet propaganda, because one holds out no goal to them. One must procure them a moral alibi. Without this they can in practice hardly justify their service in the German Wehrmacht. - The abundance of suggestions and demands in this field is indeed an indirect proof of their justification. In any case we must be clear that we may not conduct the war in the East by military means alone; we must at least also make the attempt to conduct it politically. In earlier times we National Socialists were indeed so great in this field; how is it actually to be explained that we appear to have completely lost the organ for such considerations? It may well lie chiefly in the fact that the Führer's foreign-policy advisers do not possess the right instinct for such questions. They dispose of the problems that arise in a businesslike manner and by rota, without now and again making the attempt to detach themselves from them in order to gain a new overview of them. The consequence of this is a completely inactive foreign policy, which is noted by everyone with grave concern. Today the German Foreign Minister really ought to travel from one capital of the allied countries to another, in order to raise anew the sunken courage there. Instead he watches the slow softening of our Axis front rather idly.

From Finland, for example, comes the news that the government has taken the decision to reconstitute itself on a parliamentary basis, with the intention of bringing the defensive struggle effectively to an end and of preserving Finland's independence through a skillful foreign policy. This news at first has a very alarming effect in Berlin; but after a few hours it turns out that it runs far ahead of the facts. For this decision was taken not by the government but by the Agrarian Party. That is the same party which wanted to elect Mannerheim president in place of Ryti. Thus, even if the report from Helsinki is not all too dramatic, it does show that the Axis front, or rather the anti-Bolshevik front, by no means stands as firm as one would wish.

25 May 1943

in a short time a problem of the second order. But we are indeed working mightily to bring about such a state of affairs. However, we shall still have to wait some months for it.

Nothing new is reported from the Eastern Front. It is highly explosive towards both sides. The Soviets keep announcing their summer offensive again and again, but evidently they are first waiting to see what we intend to do.

The correspondent of the "Daily Express", who has returned from Moscow, gives a rather gloomy report on the internal situation in the Soviet Union. He estimates that the Soviets have lost about 30 million people in dead, severely wounded, those starved to death and those frozen to death. That is of course a figure that carries weight. Even if this number appears to me slightly exaggerated, it is nevertheless remarkable that it is discussed publicly by the English. The intra-Soviet conditions in social and food-policy respects are, according to this report, truly horrifying. Any other country would long since have collapsed under such pressure The Soviet Union is still alive at all only because it is settled by the Russian people and because Bolshevism stands over it as a dictatorial regent. All the same, we must nevertheless familiarize ourselves with the fact that it is still alive, and indeed quite energetically.

I receive from my collaborator Ruoff of the Literature Department a report from the Kuban bridgehead. It is kept rather grey in grey. Our replacement situation is extraordinarily critical. At the front a shortage of men of the most severe extent is making itself felt. Our soldiers at the front complain a great deal about the rear echelon getting out of hand. They view the war, admittedly not from the pessimistic, but still from the grey side, and express the conviction that it will probably never come to an end. The report is little gratifying. Our troops on the Eastern Front expect an offensive for this summer, but they do wish that it will not be of a far-reaching nature and will confine itself to such objectives as we could in any case hold in the coming winter. A repetition of the winters of 1941/42 and 1942/43 would constitute a horror for the front-line soldier and would certainly provoke a psychological crisis of the first order in the Wehrmacht. We too are making mistakes in the East that are simply unforgivable.

Zoerner[1] has resigned as Governor in Lublin. He pays me a visit in order to lay before me the reasons for his resignation. In general

1 Correct: Zörner.

25 May 1943

he extracted an extraordinary amount of foodstuffs from the Lublin district. That was indeed also understandable, since this district is the most fertile in the General Government. Now suddenly a resettlement is being forced upon him, which leads to a considerable collapse of morale. First 50,000 Poles are to be evacuated. Our police get hold of only a number of 25,000; the other 25,000 go over to the partisans. One can imagine what consequences that has for the whole area. Now he was supposed to carry out a second evacuation of about 190,000 Poles. He has refused to do so, in my view rightly. Now his district is co-directed by Governor Dr. Fischer from Warsaw. Dr. Frank, the Governor General, does indeed also agree with Zoerner's¹ views, but at the moment he does not possess sufficient authority to defend himself successfully against the encroachments of the police and the SS. One could tear one's hair out in the face of such a mountain of political incomprehension. We in the homeland are waging a total war with all its consequences and are subordinating all ideological and programmatic aims to the great aim of final victory; in the occupied territories, by contrast, a policy is being pursued as though we were living in deepest peace. One could box the ears of those responsible for hours on end. They deserve nothing else, either. But from this example, too, one sees once again that in the Reich and in the occupied territories there is a complete lack of inner leadership. We suffer from a lack of clarity and consistency in our policy, which under certain circumstances may yet lead to very bad consequences.

Our propaganda in Reich territory is also no longer really catching on, as I can gather from a series of reports from the Gau leaderships. Here too it is felt as very bitter that the governing hand is lacking in the homeland. I would gladly be prepared to take upon myself the task of solving all these problems, if I possessed the necessary powers to do so. But one cannot act without at once bumping into every corner and edge. It is also reported from the Gaue, for example, that foreign broadcasting stations are now again being listened to on the largest scale. That is naturally also due to our completely opaque news policy, which can no longer convey to the people any overview of the war situation. Our reticence in discussing the question of Stalingrad and the whereabouts of our men missing there also naturally leads the relatives to listen to Bolshevik broadcasting stations on the largest scale, since these [broadcast] the names of the allegedly

1 Correctly: Zörner.